Fundamental reforms in childcare services appear to have eroded traditional support to the male breadwinner model across European states. There has been a strong debate about the direction of these changes, and the ways in which childcare services can alter the division of labor and promote gender equality. This paper deals with these issues by using fuzzy set ideal-type analysis to assess the conformity of childcare service provisions in European economies to Fraser's four ideal typical models: male breadwinner, caregiver parity, universal breadwinner, and universal caregiver. We find that there is resilience of traditional gender roles in the majority of European countries, while there are different variants of the universal breadwinner shaping different forms of childcare policies. The more equalitarian universal caregiver model maintains its utopian character.
Introduction
A substantial amount of feminist scholarship shows that normative assumptions about gender roles and the social organization of care lie at the heart of modern welfare states. These not only constraint parental choices and opportunities but also determine cultural ideals about the proper way to perform childcare and the ways in which parents should share this task (Pfau-Effinger 1998; Hobson 2011; Kremer 2007) . At their origin, all welfare states adhered to the male breadwinner ideal, although research demonstrates the existence of differences in the extent to which national policies embodied such a model (Lewis 1992; O'Connor 1993; Sainsbury 1996) .
European welfare states have adopted significant reforms in recent decades, and childcare services have become a salient political issue. On the one hand, they are considered essential to raise maternal employment in the context of social policies increasing requiring that all individuals are self-supporting, active members of labor markets (Lewis 2001; Bleijenbergh et al. 2006) . On the other hand, the emergence of a social investment perspective promotes childcare services as central for future human capital accumulation (Jenson 2009 ). As a result, public provision of childcare has increased in many countries, in spite of retrenchment tendencies in other social policy areas (Morgan 2013) .
Many scholars have suggested that these changes highlight a shift from the male breadwinner toward a universal breadwinner (or adult-worker) model, aimed at promoting men's and women's equal participation in the labor market (Crompton 1999; Fleckenstein, 2011; Lewis and Giullari 2005; Orloff 2006; Leira and Saraceno 2008) . However, others have contended that in many countries policies continue to rely considerably on maternal care and promote at best a one-and-a-half breadwinner model (Plantenga 2002; Pfau-Effinger 2005; Lewis et al. 2008a, b; Morgan 2008; Daly 2011) . As argued by feminist scholars, policies that increase employment opportunities for women without affecting the balance of unpaid work in the home can at best yield a partial form of gender equality. The universal caregiver (Fraser 1994) or dual-earner/dual-caregiver model (Crompton 1999; Gornick and Meyers 2009) represents an alternative vision of a gender equalitarian society which values equally paid and unpaid work, and supports the redistribution of unpaid labor between a wide range of actors (men, women, families, the state, and the market) (Gornick and Meyers 2009) .
In spite of the existence of contrasting views about the direction of changes and intense debates on the implications of childcare services for the gender division of labor, few empirical studies have systematically analyzed the empirical validity of such statements by incorporating a large set of countries (Korpi 2000; Korpi et al. 2013) . Comparative research has predominantly analyzed childcare services in relation to defamilialization (Hantrais 2004; Bambra 2007; Rauch 2007; Szelewa and Polakowski 2008; Saraceno and Keck 2010; Chau and Yu 2012; Javornik forthcoming) . However, this concept is affected by many ambiguities, since it does not provide recognition for individuals' right to time for care (Knijn and Kremer 1997) , nor does it confront the issues of the unequal gender division of labor (Saxonberg 2012) .
This paper aims to fill this gap in comparative research by conceptualizing and measuring variations in normative assumptions about gender roles in childcare services across Europe. In this sense, it contributes to the debate about the ways in which the universal caregiver ideal is translated into actual policies aimed at advancing gender equality (Morgan 2008; Gornick and Meyers 2009) . Moreover, it deals with the empirical question of national differences in the ways in which the male breadwinner model has been modified and the existence of subvariants within alternative models. By using fuzzy set ideal-type analysis (FSITA), we assess the extent to which childcare services in thirty European countries promote different models of division of labor (Fraser 1994) . The results of this analysis are then used to advance the theoretical debate about what constitutes the optimal (most equitable) balance of paid and unpaid work for men and women and the role that should be played by governments (Mahon 2002) .
Theoretical Discussion
Welfare State Research and the Gender Division of Labor A number of scholars have recently advanced the idea that European welfare states have significantly departed from actively supporting the male breadwinner model (Crompton 1999; Lewis 2001; Lewis and Giullari 2005; Orloff 2006; Leira and Saraceno 2008) . Lewis (2001) characterizes this shift as a movement toward an adult-worker model, while Orloff (2006) speaks of "farewells to maternalism" in gender policy logics. Despite using different labels, these authors share a common view of the empirical features of the policy template involved (Daly 2011) . First, social policies have shifted from supporting women as full-time caregivers to promoting and requiring some form of employment for all (activation). Secondly, the link between access to social security rights and individuals' relation to the labor market has been tightened (individualization). Thirdly, social policies increasingly promote the movement of care work traditionally performed inside the home to the formal, paid sector in order to free mothers for full-time continuous employment (defamilialization of care).
Although authors have highlighted the positive implications of the universal breadwinner model in terms of increased autonomy and choice for women, they also demonstrate that it is flawed both as a normative ideal and analytical tool to investigate variation in policies' assumptions. First, this model limits gender equality to the labor market and neglects the persistence of gender unbalances in the division of unpaid work (Ciccia and Verloo 2012) . Within the universal breadwinner model, parental care remains substantially unvalued, an obstacle to individuals' full participation in employment. Accordingly, the aim is not to raise men's participation in unpaid labor but rather to diminish that of women. Nonetheless, there is always a portion of time and a number of activities that cannot be covered by formal providers, either the state or the market (Tronto, 1993; Anttonen 2005) . By leaving unproblematized cultural norms that assign primary responsibility for unpaid work to women, the universal breadwinner model can have the undesired consequence of burdening women with a double load owing to the conflicting expectations attached to being a full-time worker and good caregiver.
Secondly, the universal breadwinner model is underspecified as a comparative approach (Daly 2011) . It was developed to describe a particular direction of change in European social policies, and not as part of a larger framework intended for the analysis of cross-national deviations from or variations within such a model. A useful starting point to think about subtypes is the work of Rosemary (1999) and her distinction between dual-earner/state-carer and dual-earner/marketized-carer societies. The former facilitates women's fulltime employment by providing substitute care in the form of extensive public childcare, while in the latter families make extensive use of private market care arrangements. Although these models hold similar gender assumptions, they bear very different consequences for class inequality since lower income families can only limitedly access good quality childcare facilities without public support. Moreover, the market driven version further reinforces gender inequalities because of the low wages paid in care jobs, which are still disproportionally held by women (Gornick and Meyers 2009) .
A number of authors have also argued that the universal breadwinner model represents a poor description of reality. Increasing rates of female employment have not eliminated other fundamental disparities in the labor market, particularly concerning working hours. In all European countries, women are more likely than men to work short hours, with female part-time work increasing in many countries (Lewis et al. 2008a, b) . In this view, childcare services are organized in many European states in such a way as to complement rather than substitute family care, favoring a one-and-a-half breadwinner model (Lewis 2001; Plantenga 2002; Pfau-Effinger 2005; Morgan 2008; Daly 2011) . This model represents a modification rather than a transformation of the male breadwinner model, since it is not associated with substantial changes in gender relations, nor does it address women's lack of full financial autonomy (Crompton 1999) .
Childcare Services Beyond Regimes and Defamilialization
This analysis focuses on childcare services because of their salience in academic and political debates on the reconfiguration of paid and unpaid work (Lewis 2001) . Scholars correctly point out that the net effect on the ways in which parents divide these responsibilities depends on a wide array of policies (cash transfers, leave facilities, childcare services, working-time regulations, and taxation) (Gornick and Meyers 2003; Saraceno 2011) . Nevertheless, as illustrated by Hinrichs (2000) , an approach analysing single policy components might be better suited to answer questions concerning change and stability. Whereas regime approaches focusing on overall policy logics tend to emphasize stable conditions and path dependence, a programme approach highlights that every social policy component has its specific conditions of development, functioning and perpetuation. Accordingly, if dynamics affecting welfare states in their totality can be ascertained, this is even more true for their components, since reforms and political decisions typically concern single programmes (Hinrichs 2000, 354) .
A further reason for the adoption of a programme approach derives from the complexity of childcare policies. Welfare states provide childcare services for a variety of reasons. In some countries they were first introduced with pronatalist aims (France), while in others primarily to reduce children's poverty (UK), or encourage women's employment and reduce gender inequalities in After the Male Breadwinner Model? paid and unpaid work (Nordic countries). Given the large and varying set of objectives attached to childcare, this field remains characterized by ambiguities and tensions over the treatment of non-parental care, which are reflected in large cross-national differences in the scale, scope and targeting of services. Secondly, there is great national variation in the nature and number of actors involved in the provision of childcare services. In some countries, they are mainly provided by governments, yet in others by private enterprises or voluntary associations, or various combinations of public and private sources. Alternatively, some countries rely predominantly on family members, supported by the state to differing degrees and in various ways (Anttonen 2005; Morgan 2005 ). Given the wide set of dimensions involved in the organization of childcare, focusing on the single characteristics of childcare services may contribute to make sense of these complexities.
Childcare services are central in research analysing the division of responsibilities between state, market and families (Javornik forthcoming; Leitner 2003; Rauch 2007; Szelewa and Polakowski 2008; Saraceno and Keck 2010) . A popular analytical concept is that of "defamilialization" defined as the movement of care work traditionally performed inside the family to the formal, paid sector. Typically, countries are positioned along a continuum from familialistic to defamilialistic, or within different types of familialism according to the role of the state in diminishing/strengthening families' caring responsibilities (Leitner 2003; Saraceno and Keck 2010) . However, the concept of defamilialization is itself ambiguous. If taken literally, one would expect that its goal is to take responsibility for childcare away from parents as soon as possible (Saxonberg 2012) . Nevertheless, the promotion of informal care does not necessarily contradict ideas about gender equality, provided that this is not perceived as a moral claim and that it does not frustrate caregivers' right to make an autonomous choice. Therefore, there is limited recognition within the defamilialization framework of parental right to time for care (Knijn and Kremer 1997) . Most importantly for this analysis, families remain undifferentiated units and the role of men in care remains unproblematized. Accordingly, we are unable to distinguish between generous policies intended to support women's role within the home, from equally generous policies also intended to promote men's involvement in caregiving.
1 Both types of policies would be classified as familialistic, despite bearing very different effects on gender relations.
It is more difficult to differentiate between childcare service in relation to the division of labor than for instance parental leave policies (Saxonberg 2012) . In contrast to leave policies that can directly promote a more equal distribution of unpaid work (e.g., fathers' quotas), formal childcare removes a piece of families' (women's) care load and places it within an institution outside the home. However, it does not intervene in the way in which men and women divide the remaining portion of their care responsibilities. Few studies have investigated the influence of childcare services on the gender division of labor (Gregory and Windebank 2000; Crompton 2006) , demonstrating that contradictory effects are possible. For example, Gregory's and Windebank's study shows that there is less gender equality in domestic work in France than in the UK, despite the fact that French women are more likely to be working full-time. The authors suggest that this might also be the consequence of extensive provision of childcare in France, which would enable men to fall back on the state when their partners are in employment, while British men would be forced into domesticity in order to enable their partners to work. Nevertheless, the effects of childcare services on the division of labor are likely to vary from country to country and depend largely on their design (Crompton 2006) .
Childcare Services and Ideal Typical Models of Division of Labor Fraser (1994) advanced the idea of a universal caregiver society as a solution to the long-standing feminist debate about whether women's attainment of equality required that women be treated the same as men or rather that women's differences be recognized and provided for. This model has increasingly drawn the attention of feminist scholars (Crompton 1999; Pfau-Effinger 2005; Morgan 2008; Gornick and Meyers 2009; Haas and Hartel 2010) , who also identify alternative arrangements to the male breadwinner model. Differences between these models concern the extent of men's and women's engagement in paid and care work, carers' financial independence, and the underlying gender (in)equality ideal.
(i) The male breadwinner model (MB) is based on an ideology of separate gender roles with men working full-time outside the home and women responsible for domestic/reproductive activities. Women depend financially on their husbands' income or on derived entitlements to social benefits based on their status as wives and mothers. The one-and-a-half breadwinner model represents a modern variant of this model (Crompton 1999) . (unvalued gender difference).
(ii) The caregiver parity model (CGP) maintains traditional gender roles yet values them more equally. Women remain responsible for childcare but states recognize the value of their unpaid work through generous care allowances and other benefits (valued gender difference).
(iii) The universal breadwinner (UB), or adult-worker model (Lewis and Giullari 2005) , promotes women's and men's equal engagement in the labor market. In order for women to be fully integrated in employment, childcare must be removed from households and performed by paid workers in formal settings. Care remains fundamentally unvalued in comparison to paid work (market oriented gender sameness).
(iv) The universal caregiver model (UC) or dual-earner/dual-carer (Crompton 1999; Gornick and Meyers 2009 ) aims at transforming gender roles inside and outside the labor market by promoting men's and women's After the Male Breadwinner Model? equal engagement in paid and unpaid work (Fraser 1994) . Accordingly, care is a responsibility of both families and other actors (state, employers), with paid work and care considered equally valuable activities. This model requires major transformations in the workplace since it acknowledges mothers' and fathers' equal right to reduce their working hours to care for children (Gornick and Meyers 2009 ) (transformative gender sameness). While Fraser's work deals with philosophical normative ideals, the more recent works also discuss the kind of policies that should advance the universal caregiver model. In particular, Gornick and Meyers (2009) have developed a blueprint intended to foster the movement toward the universal caregiver model. Mainly inspired by the experience of the Nordic countries (the "real utopia" of gender equality), this template is based on three sets of policies: (i) individual rights of mothers and fathers to generously paid leaves; (ii) workingtime regulations that limit full-time work hours and increase the availability and quality of part-time jobs; and (iii) high-quality, publicly financed, universally accessible childcare services. Therefore, the institutional features of childcare services are molded in interaction with other policies. For example, with the provision of paid leaves and greater flexibility in working hours, parents will make a limited use of childcare services in the first months after childbirth, and arrange their working schedules to provide substantial amounts of care beyond the first year (Gornick and Meyers 2009, 25) . Given men's and women's equal right/responsibility to time to care for their children, childcare services are configured as widely available but part-time (Pfau-Effinger 2005; Gornick and Meyers 2009). Moreover, since care is a responsibility of both families and public actors, the state offers financial support for childcare, which is also intended to equalize access to high-quality care across families with different economic resources (Gornick and Meyers 2009) .
Each of the other models promotes different ideal typical childcare configurations (table 1). The ideal place for the care of children is at home with their mothers both for the male breadwinner and caregiver parity models. Therefore, childcare places are scarce as is public financial support for services. However, the CGP differs in one important aspect, it supports mothers through well-paid leaves intended to strengthen their caring role. The one-and-a-half breadwinner encourages women to work part-time, but neither promotes their financial autonomy nor relieves them from being chiefly responsible for childcare (Crompton 1999) . Therefore, part-time childcare services represent a feature of this model. Conversely, the universal breadwinner model actively seeks to shift childcare to the formal sector by providing extensive full-time day care facilities. Nonetheless, the organization of care is not among the priorities of governments and the role of public actors is generally limited. Given the positive effect of childcare services on maternal employment (Pettit and Hook 2005; Del Boca et al. 2009 ), a second variant is possible in which public resources are directly aimed at supporting parents' use of day care services.
Data and Method
We use FSITA to assess the extent to which childcare services in European countries are organized according to different ideal typical divisions of labor. FSITA is a method for assessing diversity across a limited number of cases, which has its origin in qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) as articulated most extensively by Ragin (2000) . It has been employed in studies of welfare state change (Kvist 1999; Vis 2007; Hudson and Kuhner 2009, 2010b) , and to the comparison of national childcare provisions (Szelewa and Polakowski 2008; Ciccia and Verloo 2012) .
FSITA entails a number of advantages for the analysis of childcare services. The complexity of these policies derives from the fact that while many aspects must be considered (availability, opening hours, affordability, etc.), each assumes a different meaning according to the others comprised in the overall policy (Anttonen 2005) . For example, part-time childcare is compatible with different models according to the level of public financial resources, which can be either low (OHB) or high (UC). FSITA overcomes this limitation by viewing those different aspects not as independent variables but rather as elements of configurations that only have meaning in relation to the whole that they form (Kvist 1999) . Second, this approach does not allow for compensation effects (Hudson and Kuhner 2010a, b) . If a country offers a limited number of childcare places, it cannot compensate for this by offering generous financial contributions. Each aspect within a configuration matters in order to establish a country's membership. Finally, FSITA is more transparent than other techniques regarding the hybrid nature of some policies (i.e., weak memberships). Given that ideal types are rarely encountered in reality, cases will normally show partial memberships (,1) reflecting their distance/proximity from a given ideal type. Moreover, by examining countries' scores in non-membership configurations (,0.50), we are able to detect traces of those other models present in their policies.
After the Male Breadwinner Model?
FSITA entails four basic steps. First, we identify theoretically relevant dimensions of the ideal types leading to the construction of a useful property space, i.e., all logically possible combination of the dimensions. However, not all these combinations need to be theoretically relevant or empirically valid (Vis 2007) . The number of dimensions must not be too high, to avoid the risk of many empty cells and each case resulting in a different configuration, but should be sufficient to ensure that they exhaust the core theoretical meaning of the ideal types and that each type is described by a distinct combination (i.e., mutually exclusive).
Secondly, each dimension is defined as a set in which cases can have a degree of membership. Once the dimensions are translated into empirical indicators, the researcher must establish qualitative anchors in order to transform empirical values into 0-1 fuzzy scores (calibration). Three breakpoints are defined for each dimension: full membership (1), no membership (0), and the crossover point (0.50), representing the point where a case begins to move from being more out to being more in the set. This operation rests on theoretical and substantive knowledge of the phenomena investigated.
2 The next step is the calculation of each case's membership score. Two principles of fuzzy theory are particularly useful. The minimum principle states that the conformity of a case to an ideal typical location is given by the minimum score in the set involved, since a case scoring low on dimension A and high on B, can hardly be conceived as belonging to the ideal type A*B (where * ¼ and). The second principle is logical negation. To the extent to which a case is not fully in a set, it is partly in the set defined by its absence. For instance, if a case has a membership of 0.60 in set A, its corresponding score in the set A (where ¼ not) will be 0.40.
Defining Childcare Service Ideal Types
In this paper, we consider three dimensions: (1) childcare service coverage (S, C); (2) formal childcare time (H); and (3) public financial support for childcare (M). This choice derives from the theoretical debate about the key features of the organization of childcare services within different gender divisions of labor (Crompton 1999; Lewis 2001; Morgan 2008; Gornick and Meyers 2009 ).
The first dimension measures the extent to which primary responsibility for childcare is shifted from the home to formal settings such as center-based childcare facilities. It does not distinguish between private or public facilities since it is concerned with differences in the outsourcing of childcare to any formal institutions. However, in order to distinguish the male breadwinner from the caregiver parity model, we must consider that the need for childcare services is also shaped in combination with leave provisions (Gornick and Meyers 2009 ). Accordingly, this dimension considers: (1) the extent to which childcare services in combination with parental leave cover the first years of children's lives (S); and the degree to which this childcare mix is oriented toward services (C).
The second dimension concerns the schedule of childcare services and highlights that their characteristics are also shaped in interaction with workingtime policies. Limited hours of childcare are an essential feature of the oneand-a-half breadwinner model. At the same time, the recognition of parents' right to reduce their working hours to care directly for their children and use part-time childcare services for the remaining portion of time is also crucial within the universal caregiver model.
The third dimension is specifically intended to distinguish the role of public from market actors. Public financial support is necessary to guarantee universal access to good quality childcare services, and decent wages and employment conditions of childcare workers (Mahon, 2002) . Moreover, public expenditure on childcare sends important signals about its value for society (Gornick and Meyers 2009 ). All such conditions represent key features of the universal caregiver model.
The combination of these dimensions yields sixteen possible configurations, eight of which correspond to the ideal types described in the third section (table 2) . Two configurations describe the universal breadwinner model according to the level of public financial support (supported and unsupported). In the MB model, hours of childcare can be either low ( H) or high (H) since the paucity of available services already limits options for childcare outside the home. Within the CGP model is the level of financial support that can be either low ( M) or high (M) according to the focus on children's wellbeing and the quality of related services. These two combinations adhere to similarly traditional gender norms, and only differ regarding the level of public investment in children. In this sense, the more generous model comes closer to some version of the social investment perspective (Jenson 2009 ).
Dimensions of Comparison
This section discusses in detail the operationalization and calibration of the dimensions (table 3) .
Childcare coverage
3 . The childcare coverage rate is a commonly used indicator of formal childcare, and represents the number of children cared for in public or private facilities for at least 1 hour as proportion of all children of the same age group. Coverage rates for children 3 -6 are systematically higher than for children under 3 (respectively 76.9 and 23.9 per cent in 2005 -2009) , and with few exceptions (Poland, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Czech Republic) above 70 per cent. There is a close relationship between rates for children 0-2 and 3-6 years old (r ¼ 0.7), demonstrating that countries tend to follow the same pattern of provision for both age groups (Saraceno 2011 ). The correlation is stronger (0.9) if we consider provision in terms of weekly hours. Given that the largest and most persistent cross-country variations are found within the youngest segment (Saraceno 2011) , this dimension focuses on services for children under 3.
Childcare coverage rates refer to the usage of formal childcare, and are generally interpreted as indicators of childcare supply since this is lower than demand in most countries (Plantenga et al. 2008 ). Nevertheless, they relate to uptakes and are not easily converted to common standards, given that each country has its own constellation of care arrangements (Javornik forthcoming; Saxonberg 2012 ). In particular, we could be drawn to erroneous conclusions about childcare availability because of the existence of provisions in other areas such as parental leave. 4 For example, in Sweden the average coverage rate 2005 -2009 is 51.2, in spite of extensive public childcare and the right of children under three to a place in municipal childcare. This coverage rate reflects Two countries can have very similar effective coverage rates, but differ considerably with regard to their mix of instruments. We use the ratio between the childcare coverage and effective coverage rate to measure the portion of this mix represented by childcare services. This index equals 100 when childcare services represent the whole policy mix, and zero when they are completely absent.
Childcare mix.
Childcare coverage 0-2 Effective childcare coverage 0-2 Â 100
Figure 1 reports countries' scores on both indexes. Overall, a large degree of variation is observable across countries in levels of coverage, orientation toward services and the ways in which these two aspects are combined. In the first quadrant, we find countries with extensive supports prevalently composed by services (e.g., Denmark, Sweden); in those located in the second quadrant, provisions are also extensive but consists mostly of leave facilities (e.g., Lithuania, Hungary); parents receive limited childcare support in countries in the third (e.g., Poland, Greece) and fourth (UK, France) quadrants, but childcare services represent the greatest part of the policy mix only in the latter group.
Calibration. For the effective childcare coverage, the first threshold (fully out) is at 31 weeks representing a situation of very limited coverage (20 per cent of a child's first 3 years). The second threshold (fully in) is at 125 weeks corresponding to extensive childcare coverage (80 per cent of this period), while the crossover point at 52 weeks reflects a moderate level of assistance (33 per cent of this period) (Saraceno 2011) . For the childcare mix index, the minimum threshold is at 20 per cent corresponding to a situation of limited childcare availability. The upper threshold is set at 80 per cent and not at 100 per cent since, while it is important that families receive some support during the first years of the child, policies should also recognize parental right to childcare time, for instance in the form of parental leave (Gornick and Meyers 2009 ).
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The crossover point is at 50 per cent (overall balance of instruments).
Formal childcare time. The average number of weekly childcare hours for children under three 8 has important effects on the extent to which parents' duty and right to perform childcare is enforced. Figure 2 shows that childcare services are provided for 30 or more hours in half of the countries analyzed, while the Czech Republic, The Netherlands, Switzerland, and UK stand out for their very short weekly hours (less than 20). Calibration: the first threshold (fully in) is set at 30 because international conventions assume full-time childcare to be at least 30 weekly hours (OECD 2001; European Commission 2004) . The second threshold (fully out) is at 10 weekly hours (few hours of childcare per day), while the crossover point is at 20 hours corresponding to the average working hours of a part-time worker in the EU 27 (Eurostat 2010) .
Public financial support. Levels of expenditure crucially depend on what is considered the most appropriate form of care for children. Furthermore, we can reasonably expect that higher levels of expenditure correspond to higher quality services (e.g., in terms of child -staff ratio, care workers' qualifications, and salaries) (Myers 2000) .
While most European countries provide some care or preschool for children 3-6 years and cross-national differences are not as significant as for the under 3s, there is considerable diversity in public financing of such services (Morgan 2005; Saraceno 2011 ). Therefore, we need to incorporate expenditures for children 3-6 years in our measure of public financial support.
The first component of our public financial index comprises direct social expenditure on childcare services, since direct provision of childcare services and preschool programmes constitutes the bulk of public childcare expenditure in most countries. Governments can make use of other financing mechanisms, including subsidies toward private care, incentives for employer contributions and tax relief (Morgan 2005) . Unfortunately, comparative data on these aspects is largely unavailable. 9 The consequences of this are diminished by the fact that these mechanisms represent greater privatization compared with direct provision, i.e., reliance on private family or market sectors to cover childcare costs or to provide childcare services (Gornick and Meyers 2003) .
A first complication in comparing levels of financial support stems from the fact that the dividing line between social care and educational services is not always clear (Randall 2000) . In particular, preschool programmes that serve as alternatives to childcare are not included in social expenditure data on childcare services. For example, countries such as Belgium or Latvia investing 0.48 and 0.25 per cent of their gross domestic product (GDP) respectively, on childcare services in 2009 would be considered small spenders, in spite of the significant higher levels of resources on preschool services (0.75 and 0.98, respectively). In order to correct for this, we include public expenditure on preprimary education (ISCED 0).
10
A second complication is that overall levels of public expenditure also depend on the number of children attending childcare (and moreover the quality of services). Fluctuations in spending levels might not necessarily derive from changes in public financial support but rather from cross-national differences in the number of children below compulsory school age (Siegel 2007) . Therefore, we weight the combined expenditure on childcare and preprimary education by the proportion of children aged 0-5 years old.
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Public financial support index. † (Social expenditure on childcare services as percentage of GDP þ expenditure on preprimary schooling as percentage of GDP)/(number of children 0-5/total population).
The resulting ratio provides a crude measure of public financial support for formal childcare, which can be interpreted as the percentage of GDP invested in services for every 1 per cent of children 0-5. The higher the index, the greater the public commitment to the delivery of extensive good quality childcare services. Our index ranges from 0.04 in Ireland to 0.55 in Denmark (figure 3). Calibration: resorting to previous empirical knowledge on our cases, we establish the first threshold (fully out) at 0.10, a level commonly found in liberal economies (UK, Switzerland) showing higher reliance on privately purchased childcare. The second threshold (fully in) is set at 0.40, corresponding to spending levels characteristic of Nordic social democracies (Denmark, Sweden) well-known for their generous investments in high-quality childcare. Finally, the crossover point is set at 0.30 typical of countries identified in the literature has having ambivalent childcare policies (Germany, Finland) (Randall 2000; Gornick and Meyers 2003; Morgan 2005) .
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Results Table 4 shows countries' membership scores in the ideal typical models. All the countries achieve membership in a configuration with the exception of Belgium and the Netherlands. 13 Nevertheless, some cases show low memberships (e.g., Germany, Latvia, and Portugal) and are better described as a mix of more than one model. Despite a certain move toward the universal breadwinner model, childcare services remain embedded in traditional gender norms in the majority of European states. Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia provide limited alternatives to home-based childcare both in the form of service availability and public financial support. However, hours of childcare are with the exception of the Czech Republic full-time. This might be explained by the fact that employed women in these countries tend to be a highly selected group with similar working patterns to men and strong attachment to the labor market (Lewis et al. 2008a, b) . Accordingly, services appear to be tailored on the needs of those (few) mothers in employment. Adherence to the male breadwinner model is lowest in Germany and Latvia. In particular, concerns about declining fertility and low female employment in Germany have prompted governments to reform substantially childcare policies. New legislation in 2005 has considerably expanded investment in childcare services for children 0-2, introducing the right to a childcare place for children older than 1 year (to be implemented in 2013). These changes represent a paradigmatic shift in German family policy, which break with traditional adherence to the principle of subsidiarity to the family and hostility to working mothers (Fleckenstein 2011) . However, this new approach has not solved the many tensions and ambiguities surrounding childcare (Morgan 2013) . Despite increasing investments in services for children under 3, the overall level of public resources and childcare availability remain too limited to establish a clear new model. Other contradictory measures concern the introduction of a flat-rate monthly benefit (E150) for parents who care for their children at home, and the fact that, although the period under which financial compensation for parental leave can be received was shortened (12 months), its duration can still last up to 3 years. The peculiarity of the German case also relates to the high degree of regional diversity. Historically, childcare services were more developed in East than in West Germany. In spite of a sharp decline in the region during the 1990s, West German coverage rates remain markedly lower to date (Hofäcker et al. 2011 ). In addition to such differences, the federal structure of the German state and the decentralized implementation of childcare policy, hinder the pace of reforms, allowing for the existence of different norms and systems at the subnational level (Evers et al. 2005) . The caregiver parity model also promotes a traditional gender division of labor, but strengthens women's role as mothers and the provision of care within the home (Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Norway, Romania, Slovenia, and Luxembourg). In contrast to the male breadwinner model, this model goes further in leveling opportunities for mothers across different socio-economic backgrounds to stay at home with their children. It often draws on the rhetoric of choice, understood as women's right to choose between a homemaker/mother role or paid employment (Mahon 2002) . Accordingly, relatively well-paid and long leaves represent an important portion of available support, while childcare services remain less accessible. Public financial support for childcare services is also generally lacking in these countries, but it is among the highest in Europe in Finland, Norway, and Hungary, reflecting a stronger emphasis on high-quality services. Finland and Norway have already been singled out by previous research as the more traditional among the Nordic countries (Sainsbury 1996; Mahon 2002) . Despite sharing a universalistic approach to childcare, the volume of day care differs substantially between these countries highlighting a different emphasis on female employment and non-parental childcare. Finland was the first of the Nordic states to introduce a cash-for-care scheme (1985) supporting parental care in the home, followed by Norway in 1998. The political motive behind these measures was to ensure "parental choice" and equality between parents who use day care services and those who do not; moreover, arguments about cost containment were also at stake, parental care being cheaper than public childcare (Eydal and Rostgaard 2011) . However, there is also a competing discourse about political fatherhood in Norway, as also shown by the recent extension of the fathers' quota to 12 weeks, the longest among Scandinavian countries. Nonetheless, the adoption of these allowances remains problematic since they are mainly used by women, lower income families and ethnic minorities; thus, accentuating not only gender but also class and ethnic divides (Eydal and Rostgaard 2011) .
We do not observe a general tendency in Europe toward the one-and-a-half breadwinner model, although this appears to be a particularly strong trend in the British context, where contentions about its diffusion have been widespread (Lewis 2001; Daly 2011) . Only in Switzerland, and the UK, do childcare policies actively promote a one-and-a-half breadwinner model. In these countries, children under 3 are commonly cared for in day care centers. However, these services are offered for few hours, inducing parents (mothers) to resort to other informal arrangements or choose (short) part-time jobs. The cost of childcare services falls prevalently on families, as public financial contributions are modest or provided through tax relief as in the case of the UK (Mahon 2002) . The Netherlands comes close to this model but the overall level of childcare support (65 weeks) is slightly too high to achieve membership in this configuration. While we could characterize this country as a supported variant of the one-and-a-half model, we will see that it is better described as a hybrid between this and the universal caregiver model. This analysis shows the existence of different variants within the universal breadwinner model. The unsupported breadwinner model (Cyprus, France, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain) comes close to market-liberal type model. These countries do not openly promote separate gender roles for men and women, but the scarceness of affordable childcare tends to perpetuate gender traditionalism owing to the dominance of cultural norms that place primary responsibility for childcare with mothers (Ciccia and Verloo 2012). Moreover, given the general reliance on private funding, this model does little to overcome class inequalities in access, thus reinforcing polarization among women along class divides (Saraceno 2011) . France, Malta and Portugal have low memberships in this configuration. In France, in particular, there is an institutionalized division between preschool and day care (Morgan 2008) . While preschool offers universal services for all children 3-6 years, services for under 3 are relatively less developed, as is the level of public resource dedicated to childcare facilities. In spite of a long history of state support for working mothers, French family policy appears driven mainly by labor market considerations. Accordingly, in the context of increasing unemployment, the rate of increase of crèche places for under 3 has slowed dramatically since the late 1990s, while there have been substantial increases in public expenditure on cash benefits that either allow parents to hire an informal carer or to stay home with their children (Lewis et al. 2008a, b) . This development seem also to reflect a general approach to equality in France, which is associated with the rejection of differences and of any special measure intended to address gender and other imbalances in the labor market (Crompton 2006) .
The focus on maternal employment is accompanied by the provision of largely accessible, high-quality, and affordable childcare services only in Sweden, Denmark and Iceland (supported universal breadwinner) . Denmark is the country that goes further in promoting this model. The political goal of facilitating female employment has scored high on the political agenda gathering support from all political parties (Kremer 2007) . As a result, Denmark has the highest proportion in Europe of children 0-2 years (68 per cent) cared for full-time (35 average weekly hours) in day care centers and public investment in childcare services is very high. The early and strong development of childcare services also reflects an emphasis on their pedagogical function. According to Kremer (2007) , the ideal professional care promoted by the advocacy coalition of social pedagogues and women's movement has been crucial in securing extensive and high-quality childcare in Denmark. Accordingly, childcare is viewed as more than a place where parents bring their children because they need to care for them, rather it provides a different kind of care that is fundamental to increase children's well-being, enhance their development, socialize them for school and the labor market. All welfare states implement to some degree the ideal of professional care for children aged 5-7, but Denmark is the only country where this ideal has been widely put in practice for children 0-2. Nonetheless, the Danish gender equality project has been characterized as relatively "narrow" as exemplified by the debates over the introduction and subsequent withdrawal of the father's quota (2002) as an unduly interference of the state in private matters of families (Borchorst 2006) . To date, Denmark remains the only Nordic country without a father's quota. Gender equality concerns are mainly related to the labor market and less concerned with the equal division of care work in the family or parental right to childcare time (Eydal and Rostgaard 2011) .
The more equalitarian universal caregiver model remains a gender utopia. The Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden are the countries that come closer to it. However, in all three cases the organization of childcare differs in one crucial aspect from the universal caregiver ideal.
The Netherlands adhered for a long time to the male breadwinner model, and only since the 1990s, childcare was expanded as a way to endorse a "combination scenario" (Bleijenbergh et al. 2006) . This model was launched in 1995 by a government commission, and its language was remarkably consonant with the universal caregiver model. Its point of departure was that, depending on the lifecycle phase, both men and women should be able to choose between a mix of long part-time work, part-time household production of care, and part-time outsourcing of care (Plantenga 2002) . Therefore, the institutional setting favored childcare in the home, but also emphasized the need for a fundamental reconfiguration of working time and equal sharing of unpaid work between men and women. Legislation was also enacted to improve the quality of part-time jobs and ensure individuals' right to request part-time work, but little was done to ensure that men and women equally shared in workingtime reductions. Indeed, men's part-time employment (23.5 per cent) is by far the highest in Europe, but remains considerably below that of women (76.5 per cent) (Eurostat 2010) . Parallel to these developments, government subsidies significantly expanded the supply of childcare services (Morgan 2013) . However, the childcare sector was also changed from a publicly financed welfare sector into a demand-driven market sector in order to enhance efficiency. Since the 2005 Childcare Law, childcare has been provided by private organizations and financed through a mix of employers' contributions and income-related tax relief for families. It is particularly due to the peculiarities of this financing mechanism that the Netherlands falls short of the universal caregiver model. Public expenditure on childcare services is comparatively low because it is now incorporated in the social security system via labor costs and income taxes. Moreover, the amount of these subsidies has been progressively lowered since 2012, and restrictions have been imposed regarding the access and maximum amount of hours of childcare (CCP 2011).
While public responsibility for formal childcare is a long-standing principle in Denmark and Sweden, this also represents one of the shortcomings of this model. Given the primacy of the state in childcare, parents' right to time for childcare receives limited recognition. Whereas children's right to spend their first year of life with their parents is a well-recognized principle, parents are thereafter strongly incentivized to place children in full-time childcare. This is part of that wider social investment approach to childhood typical of Nordic countries (Lister 2009 ). Another principle of the Scandinavian welfare state also contributes to this outcome, its strong work ethic that identifies individuals' primary role as workers in the labor market. In this view, these countries provide limited recognition for parental care. For these reasons, despite having been singled out as those that go further in achieving the universal caregiver ideal, they are better characterized as universal breadwinner societies.
Conclusions
Childcare services exert a direct influence on the gender division of labor by offering parents the opportunity to outsource part of their childcare responsibilities, and thus to make more time for paid work. Although much has changed in the past decades regarding women's preferences and labor market participation, this has only marginally involved a shift in normative assumptions concerning childcare. Across many European countries, the organization of childcare services continues to assume a traditional division of labor, and only a minority of countries has childcare services explicitly designed to support a universal breadwinner model. In the context of increasing maternal employment across much of the industrialized world, this puts particular strain on families to find their own private solutions for childcare. In this sense, changes in childcare policies have been contradictory and slower than changes in social realities (Daly 2011) .
Universal breadwinner norms can shape different forms of childcare services according to the role of governments. In the supported universal breadwinner model, the state takes over responsibility for childcare by supplying universally accessible, high-quality, publicly financed services. This model is found in Iceland, Sweden, and Denmark. The unsupported male breadwinner model provides limited childcare facilities leaving families largely to their own means in finding solutions for the care of children. While this variant is more common among European countries, it carries inherent threats. It perpetuates gender inequalities in the labor market because of the lack of affordable alternatives to maternal care, it exacerbates class divides by limiting access to high-quality services, and does not confront issues relating to quality of day care services or the working conditions of people in care jobs (Gornick and Meyers 2009) .
The universal caregiver model maintains its utopian character since no European countries recognize parental right to time for childcare, while at the same time offering different forms of assistance to deal with this responsibility; for instance, in the form of part-time day care facilities. The Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark present traces of this model. Yet, the male breadwinner legacy of the Dutch childcare policy, and the employment focus of the Scandinavian welfare state prevent these countries from fully achieving such an ideal.
Finally, this paper demonstrates a number of advantages in the use of the configurational method for the analysis of care policies. First, FSITA directly confronts the multidimensionality of such policies by making sense of the ways in which different aspects combine rather than averaging out differences. Second, it deals explicitly with the hybrid nature of some policies and the existence of subtypes within certain models, namely those different policy configurations which can uphold similar normative assumptions. Third, it clearly distinguishes between real, existing, and ideal types. This is manifest in relation to the Nordic countries. Although gender equality has been high on the political agenda, and although they might to a greater or lesser extent come closer to representing the "real utopia" of gender equality (Gornick and Meyers 2009) , they still fall short of representing gender nirvanas (Lister 2009 ). Our analysis shows internal diversity among Scandinavian countries, which have at best (Denmark, Sweden) enforced a particular version of gender equality very much based on notions of gender sameness and labor market participation, limiting parental choice with regard to time for care. By resorting to external conceptual standards such as Frasers' normative models, which do not depend on the characteristics of the cases investigated, FSITA goes beyond the real utopia approach by forcing us to consider the theoretical implications and empirical consequences of our normative ideals.
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1. In Fraser's (1994) terminology, we are unable to differentiate between caregiver parity and universal caregiver societies. A classical example of the two types of policies is a well-paid, relatively long maternity leave vs. a generous parental leave that also encourages fathers' to share equally this entitlement.
2. In comparison to statistical techniques such as cluster, discriminant, and latent class analysis based on an optimization algorithm depending on the structure of existing data, FSITA follows a deductive approach. This method uses setmembership in order to define whether a case can be described by a concept or not, and the uncertainty expressed in fuzzy-sets stems from conceptual rather than empirical imprecision. This has important implications for the underlying measurement theory and the results of the analysis. Most importantly, researchers should avoid purely data driven calibration strategies since using parameters such as the mean or standard deviation implies that the classification of a case does not depend on the substantive meaning of the concept that one aims to capture, but on its relative value with regard to the other cases (Schneider and Wagemann 2012) . This renders the classification very sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of cases with extreme values, and impedes the researcher from considering non-existing types, as may be the case when dealing with normative ideals.
3. Childcare services analysed in this paper refer to education at pre-school or equivalent, education at compulsory education, childcare at center-based services outside school hours, or childcare at day-center organized/controlled by a public or private structure. Childcare by a professional child-minder at the child's or child-minder's home is not included in this definition.
4. Cultural norms can also influence decisions about the use of childcare services (Kremer 2007; Pfau-Effinger 1998) . Although we cannot directly account for this, the effective coverage rate partially reflects these differences, since we can expect greater provisions and use of parental leave in countries where norms are more favourable to childcare in the home. Nevertheless, in some countries home care could be endorsed "by default" by the lack of publicly provided alternatives to family care (Saraceno and Keck 2010) .
5. Full-time equivalents (FTE) are calculated as the duration of paid weeks of leave multiplied by the wage replacement rate.
6. Data on parental leave regulation refers to Ciccia and Verloo (2012) , while data for childcare coverage is from EU SILC. We have used 5 years mean values (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) in order to reduce the effect of fluctuations due to labour market conditions and the risk of measurement errors.
7. A childcare mix index of 100% would contradict the principles of the universal caregiver model (cf. third section), while it is compatible with the universal breadwinner model. Nevertheless, none of the countries analyzed shows values above 80% (Figure 1) .
8. Data refers to EU SILC (average 2005 -2009 ). 9. Tax breaks for childcare services are not reported in social expenditure databases. Moreover, there is large variation in tax breaks according to families' income, size, and children's age (Gornick and Meyers 2003) . According to OECD family database estimates, tax breaks are especially relevant in Germany, Slovenia, France, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Belgium (0.6 -1% of GDP).
10. Childcare services and pre-primary school expenditure data are respectively from Eurostat ESSPROS database and Eurostat Education database (average 2005 -2009) .
11. School entry age varies across Europe, yet children enter primary school at latest at the age of 6 years in most countries.
12. We have checked for the robustness of this intermediate threshold by using a lower cut-off point (0.20), which leads to modest changes concerning four countries: France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, and Spain would not achieve membership in any of the ideal types.
13. While the Netherlands configures a model (S*C* H* M) that is in between the OHB ( S*C* H* M) and the UC model (S*C* H*M), the level of coverage and public financial assistance are slightly too high to achieve membership in either configurations. Belgium almost achieves membership (0.48) in the UUB ( S*C*H* M), yet the effective childcare coverage (S) is also slightly too high (54 weeks) for this configuration.
